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Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: 
Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin 
David S. Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson 
Introduction 
Between 1991 and 1996 Russia underwent a precipitous economic 
and social decline with decreases in production, gross national prod-
uct, and wages, and increases in inequality, crime, and corruption_ 
Most people experienced a decline in their standard of living, and 
many fondly recalled the security and stability of the communist era_ 
Nevertheless, in the two main cases when the Russian electorate was 
confronted with a choice of directions in economic policy-the ref-
erendum of 1993 and the presidential elections of 1996-the majority 
chose reform_ Writing about Boris Yeltsin's surprising victory in the 
1996 presidential elections, a Pravda commentator mused: "Logically, 
he should have lost, since he was unable to fully solve any of the 
problems that have piled up: the stagnation of production, the impov-
erishment of a majority of the people, growing unemployment, the 
chronic nonpayment of wages, the decline in science, culture and ed-
ucation, the continuing conflict in Chechnya, etc. Nevertheless, Yeltsin 
received a majority of the electorate's votes_"} We will explore this 
apparent paradox using public opinion data from two large-scale sur-
veys of popular perceptions concerning social, economic, and political 
justice that were conducted in Russia in 1991 and 1996 as part of the 
International Social Justice Project.2 In this project, nationally repre-
The authors would like to thank Matthew Wyman, James Kluegel, John Clark and the 
anonymous referees for the Slavic Review for their comments and suggestions for this 
paper, and Katherine Hardin Currie for her research assistance_ This article stems 
from the collaborative work of the International Social Justice Project (see note 2), 
which was supported by funding from the National Council for Soviet and East Euro-
pean Research (now the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research) 
and by the Open Society Institute. Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson's research for this 
article was supported by a fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust. 
1. Boris Slavin in Pravda, 9 July 1996, 1-2; translated in Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press 48, no. 27 (31 July 1996): 8-9. 
2. The International Social Justice Project is an international collaborative project 
that conducted a common survey on attitudes concerning justice using nationally 
representative samples in thirteen countries in east and west in 1991, and then rep-
licated that survey in 1996 in Russia, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the 
Czech Republic. An analysis of the 1991 survey can be found in James R. Kluegel, 
David S. Mason, and Bernd Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change: Public 
opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States (New York, 1995). Principal investigators 
in the 1996 replication project are Ludmila Khakhulina and Svetlana Sidorenko-
Stephenson (Russia); Andrus Saar (Estonia); Antal Orkeny (Hungary); Alexander 
Stoyanov (Bulgaria); Bernd Wegener (Germany); Petr Mateju (Czech Republic); and 
David Mason and James Kluegel (United States). Funding for the project was provided 
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sentative samples of more than 1,500 respondents were interviewed in 
each of these two years to ascertain their attitudes and beliefs about 
social, political, and economic justice. The 1996 survey was conducted 
in the first two weeks of June, just before the first round of the presi· 
dential elections. It was an almost identical replication of the 1991 
one: 80 percent of the questions were from the earlier survey; the 
remaining 20 percent were new questions. 
We will look at a small number of questions from that survey, 
comparing responses from 1996 to those of 1991 and paying particular 
attention to the respondents' sense of their own social and economic 
status, their retrospective assessments of the past, their attitudes toward 
the fairness of the new economic and social system, in comparison to 
the old system. We will also discuss the implications of these attitudes 
for political behavior, and especially for their support of Yeltsin, of 
Communist Party candidate Gennadii Ziuganov, and of other presi· 
dential candidates in the elections in the summer of 1996. 
The presidential elections were held in two rounds on 17 June and 
3 July 1996. At the beginning of that year, polls showed Yeltsin winning 
only about 8 percent of the vote, with Ziuganov, Grigorii Iavlinskii, 
Aleksandr Lebed', and Vladimir Zhirinovskii all receiving more sup-
port.3 Over the course of the spring and summer, though, Yeltsin's 
standing improved dramatically and in the first round of voting in 
June, he won 35 percent of the vote, compared to Ziuganov's 32 per-
cent. In the July runoff, Yeltsin won almost 54 percent of the vote, 
compared to Ziuganov's 40 percent. In the face of serious economic 
decline and widespread political apathy and antipathy, this was a stun-
ning victory for Yeltsin. 
Many analysts attributed Yeltsin's victory to his effective use of the 
media, his announcement about the Chechen peace talks, or his prom-
ises of government handouts to various groups and regions.4 Although 
by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and by the Open 
Society Institute. Further information on the International Social Justice Project can 
be found at the project's website: www.Butler.edu/ISJP. 
The Russian surveys were conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion 
Research (VTsIOM), and the principal investigators were Ludmila Khakhulina and 
Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson. The 1996 survey was conducted from 3 to 15 June 
1996 in face-to-face interviews of 1,585 respondents selected by a three-stage region-
alized stratified route sample of Russia's population 18 years and older. The 1991 
survey, conducted from 20 October to 25 November 1991, employed a similar sample 
and had 1,734 respondents. 
3. President Boris Yeltsin was considered a centrist reformer; Gennadii Ziuganov 
was the leader of the Russian Communist Party and the candidate of a coalition of 
leftist parties; Grigorii Iavlinskii was a pro-market economist; the ultranationalist Via· 
dimir Zhirinovskii and his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, had done well in the 
1993 elections; and retired General Aleksandr Lebed' was a nationalist and a hero of 
the Afghan war. 
4. See, for example, Boris Kagarlitsky, "Russia Chooses-and Loses," Current His-
tory 95, no. 603 (October 1996): 305-10; Erik Depoy, "Boris Yeltsin and the 1996 
Russian Presidential Election," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 
1140-63; and Daniel Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (Septem-
ber-October 1996): 64-77. 
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these may have played a role, it is apparent from the opinion data that 
the support for Yeltsin was more deep-seated than that, being rooted 
in economic interests and a belief in the inevitability of the market by 
a significant part of the electorate. And to the extent that Yeltsin 
"bought" the elections with government largess, this was not simply a 
slick maneuver, but a response to solid support for a continuing strong 
governmental role in the economy and society. 
Real and Perceived Decline 
The government's electoral victory was remarkable in the face of 
the dramatic economic and social declines during the Yeltsin years. In 
both western democratic states and the postcommunist states of east-
ern Europe, sitting governments are often punished for poor economic 
performance. Eastern Europe, in particular, had seen electoral "left 
turns" in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and in the Russian 
parliamentary elections of December 1995, the Communist Party gar-
nered twice as many votes (22 percent of the total) as any other. 
Russia's long economic slide after 1989 seemed destined to playa 
role in the 1996 elections as well. Russia's gross domestic product 
dropped by almost half from 1989 to 1994, while annual inflation 
averaged 230 percent.5 Real wages declined by half from 1991 to 1996. 
Unemployment rose steadily, reaching 8.4 percent of the workforce 
(using International Labor Organization methodology) in early 1996.6 
Almost a quarter of the population was living below the poverty line, 
while the number of wealthy continued growing, sharply increasing 
the rich-poor gap.7 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that most Russians were 
gloomy about the state of the country, the economy, and their own 
economic situations. When asked about their household incomes in 
our June 1996 survey, almost two-thirds responded that they had "much 
less" than they needed.8 When asked how satisfied they were with their 
standard of living, on a seven-point scale, 26 percent said they were 
"completely dissatisfied," compared to 21 percent in that category in 
the 1991 survey. With respect to their overall financial situation, 55 
percent thought they were worse off than in 1991. When asked in 1996 
to place themselves on a ten-point scale of "social standing" for both 
5. Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies (World Bank), Septem-
ber-October 1995 and April 1997. 
6. OMRI Daily Report, 19 February 1996 (distributed bye-mail). 
7. The income ratio between the richest 10 percent of the population and the 
poorest 10 percent jumped from 4.5 in 1992 to 13.4 in 1995. See N. K. Chandra, 
"Dimensions of Social and Economic Crisis in Russia Today," Economic and Political 
Weekly, 11 May 1996, 1145. 
8. In a January 1996 survey conducted in Russia by Richard Rose, over half of 
the population said that they had sometimes or often had to do without both food 
and clothing over the past twelve months. "The Views of Rank and File Russians," 
American Enterprise 7, no. 4 (July-August 1996): 57. 
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1991 and 1996, about half placed themselves lower on the scale for 
1996 than for 1991. 
Our 1996 survey asked a number of "retrospective" questions, that 
is, inquiring how respondents remembered things in 1991. This en· 
abled us to compare the remembered responses of the 1996 sample 
with the actual ones given by 1991 respondents. There is a clear pat-
tern, as one might expect, of the 1996 respondents remembering 1991 
much more fondly than their 1991 counterparts experienced it at the 
time. We mentioned above the perceptions of social standing on the 
ten-point scale, with 1 being low and 10 high. In the 1991 survey, the 
average score on this scale was 4.02. In the 1996 survey, the average 
score was 4.08-essentially the same as 1991. But when we asked re-
spondents in the 1996 survey where they were on the scale in 1991, 
that average was 5.06, considerably higher than both their current 
standing and the real average reported in 1991. So even though there 
were no big changes in social standing over that five-year period, most 
people (50 percent)Jelt that they had lost ground, while only 18 percent 
felt they had gained.9 
A similar tendency was at work in the way Russians reported sat-
isfaction with various spheres of their lives. In both 1991 and 1996 we 
asked them to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with 
different things in their lives, using a seven-point scale from completely 
dissatisfied to completely satisfied. Among others, we asked about the 
political system and about the respondent'sjob, standard ofliving, and 
life as a whole. In 1996 we also asked people about their satisfaction 
"thinking back to early 1991." We also added a question on the current 
market economy (for 1996) and on the planned economy (for 1991). 
As is evident from table 1, satisfaction levels in 1996 were not all that 
different from those expressed in 1991, with a slight increase for the 
political system and slight decreases for satisfaction with jobs, standard 
of living, and overall life. But in 1996, people remembered being much 
more satisfied in 1991 than they were currently. There is, thus, a kind 
of halo effect around the "old days," even for the political system. 
Of course, yearning for the "good old days" is not unique to the 
postcommunist states. Studies in the United States, for example, have 
found that most people perceive the world as having been better in 
the past]O and that nostalgia always occurs "in the context of present 
fears, discontents, anxieties or uncertainties."]] As one might expect, 
older people are particularly likely to be nostalgic. In a stable, insti-
9. This same phenomenon was true in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary, other 
countries involved in the International Social Justice Project replication. See David 
Mason, Antal Orkeny, and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, "Increasingly Fond Mem-
ories of a Grim Past," Transition: Events and Issues in the Former Soviet Union and East· 
Central and Southeastern Europe (OMRI) 3, no. 5 (21 March 1997): 15-19. 
10. See, for example, Krystine Irene Batcho, "Nostalgia: A Psychological Perspec-
tive," Perceptual and Motor Skills 80 (1995): 131-43; and American Demographics 18, no. 4 
(April 1996): 35. 
11. Fred Davis, Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia (N ew York, 1979), 34. 
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Table 1 
Satisfaction with Various Spheres of Life, Current and 
Retrospective, 1991 and 1996 
(Mean values on seven-point scale; 
1 = completely dissatisfied; 7 = completely satisfied) 
Spheres 1991 1996 Retrospect of 1991 
Political system 2.41 4.22 
Job 4.46 5.21 
Standard of living 3.01 4.81 
Current economy not asked 4.23 
Life as whole 3.70 4.88 
1996 
3.00 
4.29 
2.92 
2.76 
3.37 
tutionalized system like the United States, though, nostalgia per se is 
not likely to have a significant political impact. In Russia, where the 
economic and political systems are still fluid, and where nostalgia is 
focused on a rejected ideological system, it can become a highly charged 
political issue. 
The increasing pessimism and negativism about the economy and 
living standards mimicked, and perhaps caused, a further decline in 
trust in the government and political institutions in Russia. Though 
the old communist political system was dismantled and largely reo 
placed with democratic institutions and processes between 1991 and 
1996, there was a sharp drop-off in the number of Russians agreeing 
that the government could be trusted "to do what is right" and that 
the government is "run for the benefit of all the people" (see table 2). 
The 1991 figures for trust in government in Russia were not too dif-
Table 2 
Trust in Government among Russians, 1991 and 1996 
(in percentages) 
How often does How often is 
government do what is government run for 
right? benefit of all? 
1991 1996 1991 1996 
Very often 3.6 1.4 1.6 0.9 
Often 22.1 8.5 21.2 4.7 
Sometimes 37.4 38.9 36.4 32.9 
Rarely 23.6 39.1 31.5 44.2 
Never 13.4 12.1 9.3 17.3 
N 1458 1364 1452 1395 
Questionnaire items: How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal 
government in Russia to do what is right? How much of the time do you think the 
federal government in Russia is run for the benefit of all the people? (Don't knows 
are excluded from the figures in the table.) 
Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia 
Table 3 
Winners and Losers in the Transition 
(in percentages) 
Definitely won 
Rather won than lost 
Neither won nor lost 
Rather lost than won 
Definitely lost 
Don't know 
3.3 
10.4 
28.7 
24.1 
23.2 
10.4 
Questionnaire item: Do you think that you personally 
have won or lost from the ongoing social transfor· 
mation? 
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ferent from those in the western countries in our 1991 survey, includ-
ing Britain,japan, and West Germany_ (The United States, despite the 
notion that it is a country of people cynical about their government, 
had the most positive scores on these two questions of any of the 
thirteen countries in the sample_) But by 1996, the Russians were more 
negative about government than any of the thirteen countries in our 
1991 sample, east or west; and more negative than all the other post-
communist states in our 1996 sample (except Bulgaria, which was in 
the midst of its own economic and political crisis at the time). 
These results complement those of other studies, including Richard 
Rose's periodic surveys in Russia where people are asked to compare 
the present economic and political systems with the communist era 
ones. In early 1996, Russians were still much more positive than nega-
tive (59 percent to 22 percent) about "Russia's pre-perestroika political 
system" and even more positive about the previous economic system 
(72 percent positive to 14 percent negative)_ As one would expect, older 
people were more positive about the old system than were younger 
people, but even among the youngest group (from 18 to 29 years old), 
a majority gave positive ratings to both the economic and the political 
systems of the pre-perestroika era_12 As will be discussed, this reflects 
the substantial personal economic problems that most Russians faced 
during the transition process. 
Overall, very few people experienced the transitional period in a 
positive way in personal terms. When we asked respondents if they 
had "personally won or lost from the ongoing social transformation," 
only about 15 percent felt that they were "winners," while almost half 
thought that they had lost (see table 3). As we will see, this overall sense 
of one's experience during the transition has a great deal of influence 
on one's perception of both the past and the present economic and 
political systems, and on one's voting behavior in the 1996 elections. 
But it will also become clear that many people voted for Yeltsin in spite 
of their own negative economic experiences of the past. 
12. "The Views of Rank and File Russians," 57. 
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Table 4 
Support for a Strong Role for the Government 
(percentage of respondents agreeing "strongly" or "somewhat") 
U.K. Russia 
1991 1991 1996 
The government should provide a job for everyone who wants 
one. 66.9 95.9 94.6 
The government should guarantee everyone a minimum 
standard of living. 82.9 88.0 93.1 
The government should place an upper limit on the amount of 
money anyone person can make. 38.6 34.2 42.6 
Raise the Floor and the Ceiling 
Russians' experience with the transition from plan to market has 
given them a curious combination of attitudes: they basically accept 
the idea of the transition to the market, welcome the opportunities 
that the market provides, and tolerate the wealth and inequality that 
it generates; but they also hold on to their statist and egalitarian views 
that call for the government to protect the poor and provide a social 
safety net. The contrast between these "ceiling" and "floor" issues are 
revealed in a battery of questions we asked in both 1991 and 1996 
about the role of the government: whether the government should 
provide everyone with a minimum standard of living; provide a job 
for everyone who wants one; and place an upper limit on the amount 
of money anyone person can make. For purposes of comparison, we 
have included the figures for the United Kingdom from the 1991 sur-
vey. 
As is evident from table 4, Russians were almost unanimous in 
supporting government economic "floors" in both 1991 and 1996_13 It 
was clear from our 1991 survey, however, that this was not just a statism 
bred of experience under communism, since most people in the cap-
italist states also supported these principles.14 On the issue of state-
provided jobs, however, the Russians were far more supportive than 
13. High levels of support for a strong governmental role in social welfare have 
been found in many other surveys as well, including James L. Gibson, "Political and 
Economic Markets," Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 954-84; and Arthur 
H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Understanding Political Change 
in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz, American 
Political Science Review 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 153-66. Another study found "a massive 
shift away from individualism" (toward statism) in Russia between 1989 and 1995. 
Robert J. Brym, "Reevaluating Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in 
Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996): 751-66. 
14. See, for example, James R. Kluegel and Masaru Miyano, 'Justice Beliefs and 
Support for the Welfare State in Advanced Capitalism," in Kluegel, Mason, and 
Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change, 81-108. 
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any other country in the sample in 1991, and remained so in 1996. 
The increased support for a minimum standard of living and the con· 
tinued high support for state·providedjobs was due in part, no doubt, 
to the continuing escalation of unemployment, unpaid wages, and pov· 
erty that was plaguing Russia at the time. 15 
On the issue of ceilings, however, Russians were much less egali· 
tarian, in both 1991 and 1996, and their opinions were not much 
different from those in democratic capitalist states such as Britain. On 
other questions in our survey, too, one sees a reluctance on the part 
of Russians to limit the accumulation of wealth. Four·fifths or more of 
the sample agreed that "people are entitled to keep what they have 
earned, even if this means some people will be wealthier than others" 
(84.2 percent); that people who work hard deserve to earn more than 
those who do not (93.1 percent); and that people are entitled to pass 
on their wealth to their children (95.8 percent). All of these figures are 
slightly lower than they were in the 1991 survey-probably a reaction 
to the widespread tales of corruption and ostentatious wealth-but still 
they remained remarkably high. 
Do Russians prefer flexible ceilings on wealth and incomes in their 
own self.interest, or for the good of the economy and the society? It 
could be, for example, that the support for high floors and ceilings 
are both bred of self.interest-wanting the assurance of government 
support in case of need, but also wanting to leave open the possibility 
and the opportunity for the personal accumulation of wealth. But these 
sentiments could also be based on some notion of what is good for the 
society as a whole-that minimums will protect the poor, and high 
ceilings will create incentives that will drive economic growth. The 
"good of society" issue is tapped by a proposition we posed in both 
1991 and 1996: "It is all right if businessmen make good profits because 
everyone benefits in the end." In 1991, 72 percent of our respondents 
agreed with this statement; in 1996 only 41 percent did (the same 
percentage disagreed). 
On this question, as with many others, it seems that the early en· 
thusiasm for capitalism, and especially for profits, had.diminished 
somewhat five years into the transition. It would be too much to say, 
however, that Russians were opposed to business profits; rather their 
orientation was more ambivalent. One could argue, in fact, that the 
1996 responses were more sensible and realistic than the overwhelm· 
ing support for business profits in 1991-support much higher than 
that of any of the capitalist countries in our sample in that year. But 
Russians did appear to favor the high ceilings primarily for the op' 
15. A 1995 survey of elites and masses in Russia found much higher levels of 
support for state welfare polides among the masses than among the elites. Arthur H. 
Miller, Regan Checchio, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Comparing Mass 
and Elite Conceptions of Social Justice in Post·Soviet Societies," paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Stud· 
ies, Boston, November 1996. 
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Table 5 
Support for Floors and Ceilings 
by Winners and Losers in the Transition 
(percentage of respondents agreeing "strongly" or "somewhat") 
Government Government Business 
standard of Government limit profits Keep what 
living provide jobs earnings ok you earn 
Definitely won 75.0 83.3 22.3 67.3 92.7 
Rather won 89.2 90.8 23.5 70.8 92.0 
Neither 93.8 95.4 37.6 47.5 87.8 
Rather lost 94.3 96.8 47.9 35.7 84.6 
Definitely lost 97.6 97.9 56.7 24.6 76.9 
Questionnaire items: The government should guarantee everyone a minimum stan· 
dard of living; the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one; the 
government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person 
can make; it is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits 
in the end; people are entitled to keep what they have earned even if this means some 
people will be wealthier than others. 
portunities they provided for themselves and ordinary people rather 
than for the potential benefit they might provide to the economy as a 
whole. 
One sees support for this proposition in table 5, which shows the 
level of support for high floors and ceilings broken down by winners 
and losers. As one might expect, the winners are more likely to favor 
high ceilings, and less likely to favor floors, than are the losers from 
the transition. But there are interesting variations on this theme. First 
of all, there are relatively minor differences between winners and los· 
ers on the issues of government provision of jobs and a minimal stan· 
dard of living. As we saw earlier, these propositions remain virtually 
universal in Russia. There are much bigger differences between win· 
ners and losers on the issue of ceilings, with winners two to three times 
more likely to think business profits benefit all and to oppose govern· 
ment limits on wealth.16 The "keep·earn" question, on whether people 
should be able to keep what they earn, is different from the other two 
ceilings questions, however. Even the losers overwhelmingly support 
this proposition. This suggests again that Russians support the high 
ceilings, not so much because they think the economy will benefit, but 
because they think they themselves will benefit. While business wealth 
16. The chi square statistic shows a statistically significant relationship (at the 
.001 level) between the winners/losers question and each of the five attitudinal ques· 
tions in table 5, though the chi square is much larger on the two ceilings questions 
(130 for "government should place an upper limit on earnings" and 222 for "all right 
if businessmen make good profits") than for the two government provisions questions 
(97 for "government should guarantee a minimum standard of living" and 91 for 
"government should provide jobs"); 16 degrees of freedom for each. 
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does not really benefit society, and the government should place limits 
on what other people can make, people (that is, me) should be able to 
keep what they have earned. 
This tendency, to favor limits on the wealth of others, but to be 
opposed to restrictions on one's own possibilities, is reflected in a 
similar discrepancy in Russians' views of the country's future as op-
posed to their own futures. When asked whether the percentage of 
poor people will increase or decrease over the next five years (asked 
in both 1991 and 1996), the overwhelming majority (64 percent in 
1996; 89 percent in 1991) thinks that the percentage of poor will in-
crease. But only about 14 percent think that their own financial situa-
tion will deteriorate over the next five years. Somewhat more, in fact, 
think their own situation will improve. So there does seem to be a 
sense of individual opportunity and possibility, even if Russians' sense 
of the overall situation and prospects for the country are not very good. 
Support for Socialism and Capitalism 
This mix of attitudes about wealth, profits, inequality, and the role 
of the state leads Russians to support, in a curious way, both socialism 
and the marketP As is evident from table 6, about two-thirds of the 
samples in both years agreed that "a free market economy is essential 
for our economic development" while only about a fifth opposed that 
proposition. At the same time, about a third of the population remains 
favorably disposed toward socialism and only another third is against 
it. Support for the market declined somewhat from 1991 to 1996, and 
support for socialism increased somewhat, but still more people sup-
port the market than socialism. IS Cross-tabulations of these variables 
show that in both 1991 and 1996, about a third of those favorably 
inclined to socialism also favored the market and only about a third 
of those favoring socialism disagreed with the development of a free 
market economy. 
17. When asked in another 1994 survey about their favored type of government 
and economy, the most frequent response from Russians (39.4 percent of the total) 
was "a government with a strong state sector and wide private opportunities for the 
citizen." See M. K. Gorshkov, A. Iu. Chepurenko, and F. E. Sheregi, eds., Rossiia v 
zerkale reform: Khrestomatiia po sotsiologii sovremennogo TOssiiskogo obshchestva (Moscow, 
1995), 26. 
18. Rose's 1996 Russia survey, mentioned above, also found more people sup-
porting continuing market reforms (30 percent) than halting them, even though many 
more people expressed positive views of the communist-era economic system than of 
the current one. Another All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research survey in 
1997 found similar results, with Russians one and a half times more likely to favor 
market reforms than oppose them, but by a similar ratio more dissatisfied than sat-
isfied with the development of the market economy thus far. Aleksandr Golov, "Re-
putatsiya rinochnoi ekonomiki u rossiyan," Economic and Social Change: The Monitoring 
of Public Opinion 3 (May-June 1997): 31-33. And an earlier survey found "broad sup-
port" for the liberalizing economic reforms of 1991. Lynn D. Nelson, Lilia V. Babaeva, 
and Rufat O. Babaev, "Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and Privatization in Russia: 
Policy and Public Opinion," Slavic Review 51, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 271-86. 
Strongly agree 
Somewhat agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Don't know 
N 
Table 6 
Support for Socialism and for the Market, 1991 and 1996 
(in percentages) 
A free market 
economy is essential 
to our economic 
development. 
1991 1996 
26.6 20.5 
25.5 30.7 
6.8 10.7 
8.4 9.1 
6.6 8.5 
26.0 20.5 
1734 1585 
Based on your 
experience of 
socialism in the 
Soviet Union, would 
you say you favor or 
oppose socialism? 
1991 1996 
7.7 13.0 
13.6 20.2 
23.8 24.6 
17.1 16.7 
17.8 13.0 
20.1 12.6 
1734 1585 
Very much in favor 
Somewhat in favor 
Neither for nor against 
Somewhat against 
Totally against 
Don't know 
N 
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We are interested, of course, not just in the changing levels of 
popular support for the market and for socialism, but in the socio-
economic and demographic determinants of such support. This is re-
vealed in regression results reported in table 7, which shows some 
interesting changes from 1991 to 1996_19 In the earlier survey, the most 
important determinants of attitudes toward both the market and so-
cialism were education, age, and gender. The highly educated, men, 
and younger people were more favorably inclined toward the market 
and less favorably disposed toward socialism_ By 1996, the strongest 
determinants of such attitudes were not demographic but economic. 
The most significant determinants of support for both the market and 
socialism were "social standing;" (where one placed oneself on a ten-
point scale) and household income_ Furthermore, when the winnersl 
losers question is thrown into the mix, this item becomes by far the 
most powerful determinant of support for both the market and so-
cialism_ So by 1996, the differences by age, gender, and education had 
largely been eclipsed by economic factors-how well one was doing 
economically and socially_20 This testifies to the enormous impact eco-
nomic change and dislocations have on attitudes toward fundamental 
issues in the postcommunist period_ As we will see, this predominance 
of economic issues will also have a major impact on the political arena 
and on the elections of 1996_ 
Experiences of Injustice 
The ambivalent attitudes toward both "Soviet-style" socialism and 
the market are evidenced as well in Russians' personal experiences 
both during and after the communist era_ In our 1991 survey, we asked 
a series of questions about how often people had "personally experi-
enced injustice" in their lives because of the following factors: your 
religious beliefs, your sex, your social background, your age, a lack of 
money, the part of the country you are from, your political beliefs, or 
your race or ethnic group_ The results from the 1991 survey were 
surprising to us, and to many others to whom we reported them: in 
all of the postcommunist states, the overwhelming majority responded 
"never" to each of these questions (that is, that they had never expe-
rienced injustice)_ An index consisting of the sum of positive responses 
19. The beta coefficients in this table indicate the relative weight of each inde-
pendent variable (education, age, etc.) in explaining variance in the dependent vari-
able (support for socialism versus the market) for each year. 
20. Other surveys have shown mixed results on this issue of economic versus 
ideological determinants of support for reforms. In a 1992 survey in Russia, James 
Gibson ("Political and Economic Markets," 981) found that "commitment to market 
institutions was not so much ideological as a reflection of perceptions of current and 
future economic conditions." On the other hand, Miller, Checchio, Reisinger, and 
Hesli ("Comparing Mass and Elite Conceptions," 14) argue, in their 1995 survey, that 
support for a market economy and a reduced role for the state depends more on 
"popular perceptions of distributive justice" than on "simple economic hardship." 
Table 7 
Determinants of Support for Free Market and Socialism, 1991 and 1996 
(standardized regression coefficient-beta) 
Support for the market 
1 = high 5 = low 
1991 1996 
Education -.15*** -.14*** 
Age .13*** .09** 
Gender (1 = M 2 = F) .10** .02 
Social standing (1 = low 10 = high) .12*** .18*** 
Income (20·tiles; 1 = low) -.07* -.18*** 
WinnersJlosers 
R2 
.10 .16 
*p < .05 **p < .01 *** P < .001; R2 significant at .001 level for all values. 
Note: 1996+ includes additional independent variables (winners/losers) 
1996+ 
-.12*** 
.06 
.02 
.06* 
-.07* 
.38*** 
.26 
Approval of socialism 
1 = high 5 = low 
1991 1996 
.l2*** .10*** 
-.25*** -.08** 
-.11 *** .01 
-.02 -.18*** 
.03 .25*** 
.12 .18 
1996+ 
.09*** 
-.04 
.01 
-.04 
.10*** 
-.49*** 
.36 
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across all eight of these dimensions found no significant differences 
between the postcommunist and the capitalist states. 21 
At the time, it seemed unlikely that Russians really had experienced 
less injustice than had people in the United States or Britain, for ex· 
ample. We discussed several alternative explanations for the results: 
that (in that disruptive transitional year of 1991) they confounded or 
conflated experienced injustice in the communist period with the early 
postcommunist period; that people were perhaps afraid to answer these 
questions truthfully; or that people living in a closed society like the 
Soviet one simply did not know injustice (for example gender discrim-
ination) when they experienced it. 
In our 1996 survey, we asked the same set of questions again, though 
this time we asked them to think first about their experience of injus· 
tice "before perestroika" (that is, the communist era) and then about 
injustice "since the beginning of perestroika" (that is, after commu-
nism). The results of the retrospective question were astoundingly sim-
ilar to those from the 1991 survey: on each of the questions (regarding 
sex, race, politics, and so on) over 80 percent of the respondents re-
ported they had "never" personally experienced injustice; and fully 61 
percent responded "never" on all of the items. Indeed, there were 
many more of these "never" responses than there had been in 1991, 
and people were no more likely to have experienced injustice "before 
perestroika" than they did afterwards. 
There may be many social and psychological factors at work here, 
including the tendency reported earlier for Russians to idealize the 
past in the very difficult circumstances of the present. But certainly 
our alternative explanations from 1991 were no longer valid: the ques-
tionnaire clearly differentiated the communist from the postcommu-
nist eras; people should no longer have been afraid to answer such 
questions truthfully; and they should have had a somewhat better idea, 
at least, of the criteria for injustice. Thus the 1991 and 1996 surveys 
in combination seem to confirm that on the individual level, at least, 
most Russians did not experience the communist era as terribly unjust. 
And as we have seen above, in 1996 they also remembered the objective 
conditions of the late communist era (social standing, standard of liv-
ing, and so on) in a quite favorable way. These may have been "fond 
memories of a grim past," but in the difficult circumstances of 1996, 
perceptions were actually more important than reality. Perhaps the sit-
uation in 1996 was better than in 1991, but if people remembered and 
experienced things otherwise, that is what will affect their attitudes 
and behavior. 
21. See David S. Mason, 'Justice, Socialism and Participation in the Postcom· 
munist States," in Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change, 
54-56; and James R. Kluegel and David S. Mason, "Political Involvement in Transition: 
Who Participated and Electoral Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe," Report of 
the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, February 1996. 
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Yeltsin, Ziuganov, and Popular Attitudes 
Boris Yeltsin seems to have won the 1996 presidential elections by 
winning over the majority of Russians who wanted both to preserve 
some of the social guarantees of the communist system and to move 
ahead into a more market-oriented system-people who wanted to 
raise both the floors and the ceilings_ The choice between Yeltsin and 
Ziuganov, however, was not so much based on ideology, or even on 
this issue offl00rs and ceilings, which most people favored in any case, 
but on more practical issues of economics and, in particular, peoples' 
own experience with the transition. We saw earlier that these economic 
issues, and whether or not people felt they were winners or losers in 
the transition, were the main determinants of attitudes toward social-
ism and toward the market. It turns out that these economic issues, 
and generalized support for or opposition to socialism and the market, 
were the greatest determinants of one's voting intentions in the 1996 
elections as well. 
Table 8 shows candidate voting intentions (from our 1996 survey) 
by this "winners or losers" scale ("Do you think that you personally 
have won or lost from the ongoing social transformation?") for the top 
vote getters in the first round of the presidential elections. As the table 
shows, Yeltsin was the overwhelming favorite of people who felt they 
were winners in the transition period, even though these constituted 
only about 20 percent of the sample. His support drops off sharply 
after that, but he still captures about half of the people who feel they 
are neither winners nor losers. Only among the "losers" does Yeltsin 
fail to win a majority. While Ziuganov wins a substantial number of 
these voters, the losers vote is divided among several contenders, so 
Ziuganov is unable to pick up even half of those who felt they had 
"definitely lost" from the transition. 
With Yeltsin assured of winning the winners' votes in the election, 
he could devote his attentions to assuaging the concerns of the losers, 
which he did by promising continued gradual change and increased 
Have you won 
or lost from 
the transition? 
Definitely won 
Rather won 
Neither 
Rather lost 
Definitely lost 
Table 8 
Presidential Voting Intentions 
by Winners and Losers in the Transition 
(in percentages) 
Intend to vote for following as president 
Iavlinskii YeItsin Zhirinovskii Ziuganov 
11.1 75.6 2.2 
9.9 77.2 2.5 1.9 
12.9 50.5 4.1 12.9 
8.5 23.2 7.0 37.1 
5.4 15.8 8.7 49.4 
Lebed' 
4.4 
4.3 
6.9 
lO.7 
13.3 
Note: Only top candidates are included, so rows do not total lOO percent. 
Totals 
4.3 
15.6 
30.6 
26.2 
23.2 
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Table 9 
Voting Intentions by Winners/Losers and Market Orientation 
For Yeltsin For Ziuganov 
(%) (%) N 
Pro-market winners 71 1 206 
Anti-market winners 50 25 8 
Pro-market losers 23 20 252 
Anti-market losers 4 52 210 
N 676 
concern for those who had suffered the most. In the last three months 
before the June election, he took concrete and visible steps in this 
direction_ He made efforts to reduce the huge backlog of overdue 
wages, he announced the doubling of the minimum pension, and he 
signed decrees compensating both those whose savings had been de-
pleted by the 1992 hyperinflation and investors who suffered losses 
from fraudulent investment schemes.22 
In the end, Yeltsin was able to win over some of the "losers" in the 
transition who were also pro-market. The losers who were anti-market 
belonged to Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Lebed' in any case, and the 
pro-market winners were solidly in Yeltsin's camp. But it was the mid-
dle groups that Yeltsin needed to attract, and as table 9 shows, he was 
able to do so. Ziuganov won hardly any of the pro-market winners, 
and Yeltsin struck out with the anti-market losers. But Yeltsin was able 
to attract most of the winners, even if they were anti-market. And even 
more important, he was able to attract almost a quarter of the largest 
of the four groups-the pro-market losers-a larger share of this group 
than Ziuganov was able to attract. 
Logistic regression results (using odds multipliers)23 for Yeltsin and 
Ziuganov supporters, displayed in table 10, again reveal that it was.not 
22. Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," 67. 
23. The coefficients in table lO are "odds multipliers," indicating the multipli-
cative change in the odds of having voted for Yeltsin or Ziuganov for a one-unit change 
in a specific determinant, net of the influence of the other determinants in the regres-
sion equation. An odds multiplier of greater than one indicates that the odds of voting 
for that candidate increase with increases in the value of a given independent variable 
(determinant). An odds multiplier of less than one indicates that the odds of voting 
for that candidate decrease with increases in the value of the independent variable. 
For example, in table 10, in the Yeltsin column, a coefficient of 1.26 means that the 
odds of voting for Yeltsin increased, on average, by 26 percent for each unit change 
in the variable measuring satisfaction with standard of living, which was a seven-point 
scale from completely dissatisfied (1) to completely satisfied (7). Compounded across 
the seven-unit range of this variable, a 26 percent increase from unit to unit results 
in a large difference between the most dissatisfied and the most satisfied people in 
the predicted odds of intending to vote for Yeltsin. For further information on this 
method, see Alfred Demaris, Logit Modeling: Practical Applications (Newbury Park, Calif., 
1992). 
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Table 10 
Determinants of Voting Preference for Yeltsin and Ziuganov 
(odds multipliers from logistic regressions) 
Yeltsin Ziuganov 
Age 1.01 1.03*** 
Sex 1.29 .99 
Education 1.03 1.09 
Winners/losers .73*** 1.22 
Satisfaction with standard of living 1.26*** .88 
Experienced injustice pre· perestroika 1.03 .71 ** 
Experienced injustice post·perestroika .92 1.16 
Index of support for equality .99 .87 
Index of support for functional inequality .85 1.06 
Support for government minimums .97 1.24 
Support for government limits on money 1.12 .96 
Support for government provided jobs 1.04 .95 
Support for free market .64*** 1.39*** 
Support for socialism 1.38*** .48*** 
Chi square (df) 310 (14)*** 299 (14)*** 
**p < .01 ***p < .001. 
Note: All of the "support" variables (the last five in the table) were coded on a 5-point 
scale with "1" indicating the highest support. 
primarily ideology or demographics that divided Yeltsin and Ziuganov 
voters, but rather one's personal experiences and general support for 
the old or the new system_ What is most informative about this table 
is the significance levels of these coefficients, which are marked by the 
asterisks_ The independent variables that have the strongest effect on 
voting intentions for Yeltsin and Ziuganov have asterisks (with more 
asterisks indicating a greater level of statistical significance). Overall, 
one should note the relative lack of significance of both the demo-
graphic variables (age, education, sex) and the "ideological variables," 
which consist of individual questions mentioned earlier in this paper 
(for example, those in table 4) plus two indices of attitudes tapping 
support for equality and for "functional inequality.,,24 Except for the 
age variable for Ziuganov, most of these have little bearing on intent 
to vote for these two candidates. 
24. The "equality" index is the mean of the z scores of four questions (alpha = 
.60): "How much influence should the size of the family the employee supports have 
in determining the level of pay for an employee?"; "The fairest way of distributing 
wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares"; "The most important 
thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from 
those who have earned more than they need"; "It is just luck if some people are more 
intelligent or skillful than others, so they don't deserve to earn more money." The 
"functional inequality" index is the simple mean of two questions with a five-point 
agree-disagree scale: "There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in 
income are large enough," and "It is all right if businessmen make good profits because 
everyone benefits in the end." 
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For both candidates, the most powerful determinants of voting are 
the orientations toward the market and toward socialism, with the 
expected results that the more pro-market people supported Yeltsin 
and the more pro-socialist supported Ziuganov_ But from the results 
both in this table and earlier, we know that support for these two 
concepts is not so much rooted in ideology as in individual experi-
ence-especially economic experience_ For Yeltsin, the other deter-
minants of support are economic-satisfaction with the standard of 
living and the winners/losers question-and, to a lesser extent, support 
for "functional inequality_" We saw this in table 8, where Y eltsin is 
much more likely to draw the support from those who have done well 
in the transition_ 
More surprisingly, perhaps, Ziuganov's support was also not par-
ticularly ideologicaL None of the ideological variables in the equation 
were significant predictors of support for Ziuganov_ His support, 
rather, was determined by people's orientation toward the past; his 
supporters were more likely to be older, not to have experienced in-
justice in the communist era; supportive of socialism; and skeptical of 
the market- But this support for the past, as we have seen, is bred more 
of nostalgia than of ideology_ Most people, especially Ziuganov's sup-
porters, remember the communist era as a time when they were better 
off, and not particularly oppressed, apparently. 
Yeltsin did, however, draw more votes than Ziuganov in both the 
first and the runoff elections. It seems likely that this was due in part 
to his success at locking in support from the reformers and the win-
ners, while at the same time drawing some support, at least, from those 
who were not doing so well but who nonetheless supported the market-
In the end, while some people may have remembered the past more 
fondly than they actually experienced it, they did not want to turn 
back the clocks. During the course of the spring 1996 campaign, Yeltsin 
was able to boost his support by using the media effectively, capital-
izing on popular support for both the market and state guarantees, and 
mobilizing those supporters to vote. It helped that his multiple op-
ponents divided the opposition vote. 
The ideological similarities and differences among supporters of 
the major presidential candidates are evident from table 11. This table 
shows the percentage of supporters of each of these candidates who 
agreed (strongly or somewhat) with some of the principles of equality, 
statism, floors, and ceilings that have been discussed in this article. 
These principles are arranged roughly by the amount of agreement 
among the supporters of the various candidates, with general agree-
ment among all supporters for the principles at the top of the table, 
and less agreement for those at the bottom. As we have seen before, 
there is almost universal support for some of the "high floors" ques-
tions, and this is true across all four groups of supporters.25 Almost all 
25_ These results reinforce a similar comparison of attitudes by supporters of 
various political parties in the 1993 elections: while supporters of the communists 
differed substantially from those favoring Russia's Choice on their attitudes toward a 
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Table 11 
Support for Equality and Statism 
by Supporters of Presidential Candidates 
(percentage of respondents "strongly agreeing" or "agreeing") 
Yeltsin Zhirinovskii Ziuganov Lebed' 
Government should provide 
minimum standard of living. 92.3 95.4 96.5 97.9 
Government should provide jobs. 94.3 96.9 97.2 97.0 
Hard workers should earn more. 93.4 95.1 94.3 99.0 
People are entitled to pass wealth to 98.5 84.6 93.1 98.0 
children. 
Give everyone equal shares of 21.6 40.3 44.0 29.3 
wealth. 
People are entitled to keep 90.7 65.6 70.4 95.3 
earnings. 
People should get what they need. 43.3 55.6 64.3 53.4 
Government should place limits on 33.0 45.0 59.0 53.2 
wealth. 
the supporters of all the candidates also favor some of the "high ceil-
ings" propositions. The differences among the groups are more pro-
nounced on the questions involving the redistribution of resources. 
On these the Yeltsin supporters, in particular, have much less favorable 
opinions than the supporters of the other candidates, and especially 
of the Ziuganov supporters. 
But overall, there is a remarkable level of agreement on some of 
the key ideological issues: that the government should continue to 
provide basic minimums, in terms of both jobs and a standard ofliving; 
but that the society should abandon radical egalitarianism in favor of 
a more meritocratic system where rewards and incentives matter. It is 
this middle ground, we think, that Yeltsin appealed to and capitalized 
on. His program was to continue the reforms toward a market econ-
omy, while at the same time attempting to protect the most vulnerable 
members of society. In this, his campaign appeals matched the senti-
ments of most Russians. The people that opposed him did so largely 
because of their own problems during the transition, and this caused 
a nostalgic fondness for the past. But this nostalgia did not always 
translate into votes. As liberal former Prime Minister Egor Gaidar com-
mented: "Millions of people are prepared to conduct idle conversa-
tions about how great everything used to be and how terrible every-
market economy, supporters of all parties overwhelmingly favored state control of 
large industries and state responsibility for jobs, health care, and housing. Matthew 
Wyman, Bill Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and 
Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections," Europe·Asia Studies 47, no. 4 (1995): 
591-614. 
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thing is now. But left to himself, a person is not carried away by such 
thoughts. And when left one-on-one with a ballot, a person was able 
to ask himself: My friend, do you really want that badly to go back to 
the past?,,26 
The nostalgia was much more rooted in economics than in ideology 
and reflected the widespread deterioration of the economy and of 
living standards since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the less-
than-ideological orientation of most Russians, however, it seems un-
likely that this hankering for the past will lead people to favor a res-
toration of the old system. Most Russians are suffering, but they see 
hope in continued moderate reform and expect, however unrealisti-
cally, that their own situations will eventually improve_ 
This voting behavior is practical and interest-based in a way that 
increasingly resembles "normal" voting behavior in western democra-
cies. Some analysts of Russian voting behavior and public opinion have 
suggested that votes and political participation in Russia have not been 
strongly related to economic issues or cleavages.27 If this were true 
before, it no longer seems to be the case. In 1996 Russians voted for 
Yeltsin (or for Ziuganov) for reasons closely tied to their own economic 
experiences, interests, and attitudes. Both in this respect, and in their 
preference for Yeltsin's appeal for continuity and stability, Russia is 
becoming a more normal and stable society. 
26. Interview with Gaidar in Novoe vremia, July 1996, no. 28:12-13; translated in 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 48, no. 29 (14 August 1996): 16-17. 
27. For example, Timothy J. Colton, "Economics and Voting in Russia," Post-Soviet 
Affairs 12, no. 4 (October-December 1996): 289-317; and Stephen White, Richard Rose, 
and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, Nj., 1997). 
